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Drafting Arbitration Agreements: A Practitioner’s 
Guide for Consumer Credit Contracts 
Introduction 
In recent years, creditors seeking some relief from costly consumer class 
action lawsuits have turned to arbitration agreements for protection. A well-drafted 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause that prohibits class action relief is likely to 
withstand consumer challenges to the clause’s enforceability and provide the 
creditor the protection it seeks.1 In the standard arbitration agreement, the creditor 
and the consumer agree to arbitrate disputes arising under the related contract.2 
The consumer also waives the right to proceed as a class representative in 
arbitration.3 Working together, a mandatory arbitration agreement and a class 
action waiver result in a prohibition against the consumer’s participation in a class 
action before a court.4 The consumer must instead proceed as an individual in an 
arbitration proceeding.5 
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 1. See Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining that the Federal 
Arbitration Act preempts a Washington state law that invalidates class-action waivers); Johnson v. West 
Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 
26 (1991)) (noting that contracts may provide for statutory claims to be handled through arbitration); 
AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 200 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that while an arbitration 
provision prohibiting class treatment may be unfair, plaintiff must demonstrate such unfairness); Richard M. 
Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 
1245 (2001) (stating that “[a]rbitration agreements must be enforced, even if the result would be inefficiency”). 
 2. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and 
the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 365 (2011); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (signaling that courts asked to compel arbitration must 
first determine whether the parties have agreed to handle disputes through arbitration). 
 3. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (reasoning that classwide 
arbitration would interfere with the fundamental purpose of arbitration and the FAA). 
 4. J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1748 (2006) (recognizing a recent trend by employers of incorporating class 
action waivers into arbitration clauses to shield themselves from potential class action lawsuits); see also 9 U.S.C. 
§ 3 (2006) (“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue 
referable to arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in 
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Although arbitration provisions are undoubtedly the most effective defense a 
creditor has against consumer class actions, enforcement of those provisions is not 
guaranteed in all situations or in all jurisdictions.6 Consumers challenge arbitration 
agreements and class action waivers under various legal theories, but chief among 
them is the state common law defense of unconscionability.7 In addition, 
consumers claim that arbitration agreements implicitly prohibit consumers from 
spreading the costs of litigation among litigants with common claims, which has the 
effect of precluding an individual from being able to vindicate his or her federal 
statutory rights.8 
In order to meet these challenges and ensure that an arbitration agreement will 
be enforced, an arbitration agreement must be crafted carefully. This Article will 
review the aspects of arbitration clauses that have rendered them unenforceable and 
suggest drafting techniques to counter those challenges.9 The Article begins by 
providing some background on federal arbitration law10 and then surveys the 
current landscape of the case law while focusing on the recent Supreme Court 
decision in AT&T v. Concepcion and its progeny.11 It then analyzes the main legal 
doctrine, unconscionability, used by opponents of arbitration in motions to strike 
 
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the 
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”); 9 U.S.C. 
§ 4 (2006) (“The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for 
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties 
to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”). 
 5. Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 441 N.Y.S.2d 70, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (Bloom, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “if the matter is to proceed in arbitration it must proceed as an individual claim”).  
 6. E.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court’s ruling, which 
voided class action bans, because it failed to find a two-year limitation period unconscionable); Luna v. 
Household Fin. Corp., III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1178–79 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (addressing the need for courts to 
balance the value of class actions with strong public policy that favors enforcement of arbitration agreements); 
Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 951 (Or. 2007) (stating that class action bans are 
unconscionable and would give businesses opportunities to commit fraud); Muhammad v. County Bank of 
Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 99–100 (N.J. 2006) (establishing that, in New Jersey, class arbitration waivers are 
not exculpatory clauses and the presence of one in an arbitration agreement is unconscionable). 
 7. See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1004 (Wash. 2007) (noting Plaintiffs’ argument that 
Cingular’s class action waiver was “substantively and procedurally unconscionable”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1663–64 (9th ed. 2009) (defining unconscionability as “[t]he principle that a court may refuse to enforce a 
contract that is unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during contract formation or because of 
overreaching contractual terms . . .”). 
 8. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 633–36 (2012) (asserting that challenges to class action waivers were made 
under two arguments: (1) unconscionability and (2) prohibition against spreading costs of litigation precludes 
individuals from vindicating federal statutory rights); see also Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 
U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (determining that “[i]t may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude 
a litigate such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum”). 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part II.A (discussing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)). 
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the clauses from consumer contracts.12 To respond to and ideally defeat these 
arguments, we provide a drafter’s guide addressing this main threat to 
enforceability.13 Finally, we take a quick look at the road ahead for arbitration.14 
I. Background 
Consumer challenges to arbitration agreements take various forms, but to 
understand why arbitration agreements have become the battleground of consumer 
protection advocates, one need only identify those arguing vehemently on behalf of 
consumers against class action waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements: the 
plaintiffs’ bar.15 All other issues aside, plaintiffs’ attorneys have the most to lose 
from an effective class action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement.16 To the 
extent such clauses reduce class action lawsuits (and concomitantly, class action 
settlements), plaintiffs’ attorneys stand to lose a large amount of business because 
they cannot collect the significant class action fees in arbitration proceedings where 
class claims are prohibited.17 
The standard argument against class action waivers is that it is uneconomical for 
consumers to pursue small claims individually, either through the courts or in 
arbitration.18 It is not clear that this is the case, but what is clear is that it is 
uneconomical for a plaintiff’s attorney to represent consumers with small claims on 
an individual basis.19 Thus, regardless of the benefit that arbitration actually 
provides to consumers (and there are benefits),20 plaintiffs’ attorneys will continue 
to vigorously challenge the enforceability of arbitration agreements to preserve the 
flow of revenue that streams from large class action settlements. It is largely because 
 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Parts III.A–C. 
 14. See infra Part III.D. 
 15. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (1991) 
(arguing that plaintiffs’ attorneys have the most to gain financially in class action proceedings). 
 16. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action 
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2000) (criticizing class actions as serving plaintiffs’ attorneys more 
than plaintiffs and creating conflicts of interest between class attorneys and their clients). 
 17. See Robert Alexander Schwartz, Note, Can Arbitration Do More For Consumers? The TILA Class Action 
Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 825 (2003) (noting the significant fees plaintiffs’ attorneys stand to receive 
in such actions). 
 18. See Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not? Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration 
Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 247 (2008) (stating that class action waivers 
essentially eliminate the opportunity for plaintiffs to pursue individual claims because the costs of individual 
suits are exorbitantly high); see also, e.g., Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1219 (N.M. 2008) 
(arguing that the opportunity to seek class relief is critical because it “allows claimants with individually small 
claims the opportunity for relief that would otherwise be economically infeasible”). 
 19. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of 2002: California Courts Lure Plaintiff’s Lawyers 
(but Undermine Federal Arbitration Act) by Refusing to Enforce “No-Class Action” Clauses in Consumer 
Arbitration Agreements, 58 BUS. LAW. 1289, 1297 (2003). 
 20. Id. at 1297–99. 
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of this threat to their livelihoods that arbitration agreements have been so 
strenuously challenged.21 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
Enacted in 1925 to promote arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution process 
to litigation, the Federal Arbitration Act22 (FAA) provides that a written arbitration 
agreement involving interstate commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”23 The explicit goal of the FAA is to encourage arbitration by 
requiring courts to honor arbitration agreements in accordance with the 
contracting parties’ expectations.24 The federal law accomplishes this by partially 
preempting state law.25 However, Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration 
clauses can still be invalidated by general state law contract defenses such as fraud, 
duress, and unconscionability.26 This so-called “savings clause” notably excludes 
state-law defenses that apply exclusively to arbitration or defenses that derive their 
meaning from the fact that an arbitration clause is at issue.27 
Of the state-law defenses, unconscionability is the most often used and most 
effective legal justification for invalidating arbitration agreements.28 Because 
California has served as the leading battleground state for disputing arbitration 
 
 21. Hal Davis, Banks Follow Brokerages: Arbitrate Yes, Litigate No: Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Say Forcing 
Consumers to Arbitrate Disputes Will Eliminate Class Actions and Is Unfair, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 4. 
 22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–208, 301–307 (2006). 
 23. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 24. “The ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced 
according to their terms.’” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Volt Info. 
Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
 25. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (determining that “the California Franchise 
Investment Law directly conflicts with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause”); 
see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). 
 26. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (providing for the validity and enforceability of arbitration clauses “save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”); see also Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 
F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that “state law governs ‘generally applicable contract defenses [to an 
arbitration clause], such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability’” (quoting Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 
U.S. 681, 687 (1996))). 
 27. Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the 
California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 48 (2006); see also 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (holding that “[c]ourts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under 
state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492–93 n.9 (1987) 
(recognizing that state laws are applicable when they were established to handle issues surrounding the validity, 
revocability, and enforceability of contracts). 
 28. See, e.g., Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1157–62 (9th Cir. 2012) (analyzing the substantive and 
procedural unconscionability under the FAA); Stiener v. Apple Computer, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022 
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding a class arbitration waiver unconscionable); Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247 
P.3d 130, 139–46 (Cal. 2011) (discussing whether a waiver is unconscionable). 
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agreements,29 this Article will focus on California state law in exploring the doctrine 
of unconscionability. It is to this legal doctrine that we now turn. 
B. State Law Doctrine of Unconscionability 
Unconscionability is the main defense used to invalidate arbitration clauses.30 As a 
creature of state common law, its specific application may vary from state-to-state; 
however, the elements of unconscionability are common to all states and can 
effectively be discussed in general.31 The doctrine consists of two elements — 
procedural and substantive unconscionability.32 For a court to find a contract term 
unconscionable and thus unenforceable, a party must show that both elements are 
present in the transaction.33 This is a question of law for the judge.34 The procedural 
element addresses how the contract was negotiated and focuses on “oppression” 
and “surprise” in the negotiating process with regard to the suspect provision.35 The 
substantive element focuses on the actual terms of the agreement, emphasizing 
terms that are overly harsh or one-sided.36 
In determining whether a particular contract provision or the entire contract is 
unconscionable, the two elements need not be found in the provision or contract to 
a specific degree.37 Rather, they are weighed in a balancing test: “[T]he more 
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural 
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is 
unenforceable, and vice versa.”38 
 
 29. Frank Blechschmidt, Comment, All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the 
Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 556 (“California pioneered the use of 
unconscionability to protect individuals from class action waivers.”). 
 30. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal 
Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008); see also Susan Randal, Judicial Attitudes Toward 
Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194–96 (2004) (noting the statistical 
rise of unconscionability arguments and the relative success of such arguments in the arbitration context). 
 31. See Yongdan Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration Agreements, With 
Emphasis on Class Action/Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665, 670–96 (2010) (comparing and noting 
commonalities among five states’ application of the doctrine of unconscionability in the arbitration context).  
 32. Broome, supra note 27, at 48 (citing Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 
690 (Cal. 2000)). 
 33. Id. (citing Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690). 
 34. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review 
granted, 272 P.3d 976 (Cal. 2012).  
 35. Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, 
Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 
9 (2012) (indicating that this language was originally borrowed from comments to the Uniform Commercial 
Code). 
 36. Broome, supra note 27, at 49 (quoting Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690). 
 37. Id. at 48–49 (citing Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690). 
 38. Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC, 282 P.3d 1217, 1232 (Cal. 2012) 
(quoting Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690). 
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1. Procedural Unconscionability 
To determine whether an arbitration clause is procedurally unconscionable, courts 
consider two factors: oppression and surprise.39 These are alternative prongs, either 
of which alone can satisfy the procedural element.40 Courts find oppression where 
there is inequality of bargaining power resulting in no real negotiation between the 
parties and no meaningful choice for the consumer.41 The surprise factor concerns 
the extent to which the terms of the contract are hidden or are not easily readable to 
the consumer.42 
When discussing the procedural element, courts will often discuss whether the 
contract is a contract of adhesion. A contract of adhesion is a standardized contract 
drafted by a party of superior bargaining strength (i.e., the creditor) and imposed 
on the party contracting with the drafter.43 The other party can only either adhere to 
all of the contract’s terms or reject the entire contract completely. The Supreme 
Court of the United States recently recognized that all consumer contracts are 
contracts of adhesion.44 However, that a contract is one of adhesion does not render 
it presumptively unconscionable.45 In fact, outside of the arbitration context, 
adhesion contracts are routinely found enforceable.46 Yet when a contract has an 
arbitration provision, the conclusion that a contract is a contract of adhesion will 





 39. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690 (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121–22 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1982)). 
 40. Broome, supra note 27, at 58. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 58–59. 
 43. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689 (quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr 781, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1961)). 
 44. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (“[T]he times in which consumer 
contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”). 
 45. See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract 
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 479 (2006) (noting that adhesion 
contracts are frequently enforced and used in the overwhelming majority of contracts); Andrew A. Schwartz, 
Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 354–55 (2011) (stating that 
“courts have never adopted a flat rule against enforcing” contracts of adhesion and thus conduct judicial 
reviews of such contracts); cf. Sierra David Sterkin, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California: A Consumer’s 
Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 298 (2004) (noting that contracts of adhesion are considered 
procedurally unconscionable under California law). 
 46. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 45, at 479 (stating that “[a]dhesion contracts are ubiquitous” and 
“generally are enforced”). 
 47. Broome, supra note 27, at 59–61; see also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1265–66 (1983) (noting a “substantial body of case law” in which courts 
have determined arbitration agreements within contracts of adhesion to be unenforceable). 
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2. Substantive Unconscionability 
To determine whether the arbitration clause is substantively unconscionable, courts 
look for overly-harsh and one-sided terms in the arbitration clause. If the 
arbitration clause lacks a “modicum of bilaterality,” courts are likely to find 
substantive unconscionability and refuse to enforce the arbitration clause.48 
Generally, courts will sever unconscionable terms from an agreement and enforce 
the rest of the agreement.49 This might be possible, for example, if the only 
unconscionable term was one that required the plaintiff to advance the costs of 
arbitration.50 A court might strike this provision and otherwise compel arbitration 
subject to the remaining terms of the agreement. 
However, a court will not always sever a particular unconscionable term and 
enforce the other conscionable provisions of an agreement. If a court finds that the 
arbitration clause contains many terms deemed unconscionable such that the 
agreement is “permeated by unconscionability,” the court will not sever the 
offending terms and will refuse to compel arbitration.51 
II. Caselaw 
Having outlined the background of the FAA and generalized the state law doctrine 
of unconscionability, this Article will now review the United States Supreme 
Court’s most recent decision on the FAA and the California courts’ responses to 
that decision. An evaluation of these decisions serves as a guide for developing 
effective drafting techniques, which we distill into a drafting guide in the 
penultimate section. 
A. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
In April 2011, the Supreme Court decided its most recent FAA case in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.52 At issue in Concepcion was whether the FAA 
prohibited a state from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration 
 
 48. Broome, supra note 27, at 48–50 (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 151 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997)) (describing elements considered in establishing substantive unconscionability). 
 49. Id. at 44–45. 
 50. See, e.g., Gentry v. Super. Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 570 (Cal. 2007) (stating that the preference to sever 
unconscionable aspects of arbitration agreements is “particularly appropriate in the case of class arbitration 
waivers”); Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he strong 
preference is to sever [unconscionable clauses] unless the agreement is ‘permeated’ by unconscionability.” 
(citing and quoting Dotson v. Amgen, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341, 350–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010))). 
 51. Ajamian, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 799; see also Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 
788 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding an entire contract invalid after several clauses were found unconscionable); Ting v. 
AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (refusing to enforce all terms of contract where terms were 
“permeated with unconscionability and illegality”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 52. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 Drafting Arbitration Agreements 
370 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
agreements on the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures.53 More 
specifically, Concepcion considered whether California’s Discover Bank rule — 
which stated that in a contract of adhesion, class action waivers were void as against 
public policy — unconstitutionally interfered with the FAA.54 The Plaintiffs, who 
were arguing that the class action waiver was unconscionable, had each signed a 
cellular service agreement with AT&T that included a new free cellular phone.55 The 
Plaintiffs received the phone at no charge, but were still required to pay sales tax on 
the retail value of the phones.56 The agreement contained an arbitration clause 
requiring any dispute to be submitted to arbitration and also included a class action 
waiver clause, requiring any dispute between the parties to be brought in an 
individual capacity.57 The Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against 
AT&T, alleging that the practice of charging sales tax on a phone advertised as free 
was fraudulent, and AT&T moved to compel arbitration.58 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable because it was unconscionable under the rationale of 
Discover Bank.59 When the case finally made it to the Supreme Court, the Court 
invalidated the Discover Bank rule, holding that the FAA preempted California law.60 
The Court noted that while the FAA’s saving clause preserves generally applicable 
contract defenses, “nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that 
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”61 
Before Concepcion, the Supreme Court had said that “a court [may not] rely on 
the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that 
enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect 
what . . . the state legislature cannot.”62 The Supreme Court stated that California 
courts were impermissibly interfering with the fundamental attributes of arbitration 
in contravention of the arbitration scheme prescribed by the FAA.63 The Court 
observed that the FAA cannot be held to destroy itself by permitting the application 
 
 53. Id. at 1745–46. 
 54. Id. at 1746. 
 55. Id. at 1744–45. 
 56. Id. at 1744. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1740. 
 60. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 61. Id. at 1748. 
 62. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
 63. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011). 
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of a common law doctrine (here unconscionability) that is absolutely inconsistent 
with the provisions of the FAA.64 
Under California’s Discover Bank rule, class-wide arbitration is not required;65 
however, the rule effectively allows a consumer to demand class-wide arbitration 
for conflicts arising out of a consumer contract.66 This rule in California, deriving 
from the doctrine of unconscionability, was limited in application by the state 
courts to adhesion contracts. The Discover Bank rule states that: 
[W]hen [a class action] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion 
in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably 
involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party 
with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately 
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, 
then the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party from 
responsibility for its own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of 
another.67 
It is unclear why this rule would even apply to AT&T’s situation in the first instance 
because AT&T was not “cheating” consumers out of small sums of money; as with 
any other merchant, AT&T was merely acting as California’s tax collector and 
remitting the proper amount of sales tax to the state.68 Regardless, today’s reality is 
that every consumer contract is a contract of adhesion.69 
The Concepcion Court, looking at the Discover Bank rule, concluded that “class 
arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than 
consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”70 This is because of the nature of class 
arbitration. The principal advantage of arbitration — its informality and relative 
lower expense — is sacrificed by class arbitration.71 In a similar vein, the informality 
of arbitration is inadequate for the settlement of class disputes.72 To bind all class 
 
 64. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (citing Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227–
28 (1998)). 
 65. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1109–10 (establishing the rule for California courts which generally 
classified mandatory collective arbitration agreements in consumer contracts as unconscionable); see also 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (“California’s Discover Bank rule . . . does not require classwide arbitration . . . .”). 
 66. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. 
 67. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 68. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (explaining that the fees at issue in the case were collected to pay 
mandatory state taxes). 
 69. Id. at 1750. 
 70. Id. at 1750–51. 
 71. Id. at 1751 (noting that “class arbitration requires procedural formality” and “makes the process slower, 
more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”). 
 72. See id. at 1752 (discussing errors generated by inadequate review resulting from informal procedures as 
well as the compounding cost of these errors in class action proceedings); see also Judith Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
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representatives to a class decision, procedural formality is required.73 The 
Concepcion Court surmised that, considering the high stakes of class disputes, and 
the nature of arbitration, arbitration is ill suited as a manner of deciding class 
disputes.74 
In Concepcion, the majority did not dispute that the Discover Bank rule is a valid 
ground for the revocation of any contract under California law and thus nominally 
falls within the FAA savings clause permitting state law challenges to arbitration 
agreements.75 However, the majority found that, although the savings clause 
preserves such state law contract defenses, nothing in Section 2 suggests an intent to 
preserve state law that stands as an obstacle to the FAA’s objective of promoting the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements.76 The majority held that because it allows 
consumer claimants to force class-wide arbitration in any case, which the Court 
found to be antithetical to arbitration, the Discover Bank rule is an obstacle to the 
FAA’s objectives.77 Based on this logic, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision.78 
Despite the Concepcion decision affirming the FAA’s liberal policy favoring 
arbitration, courts — and the Ninth Circuit in particular — continue to scrutinize 
arbitration agreements for evidence of procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.79 Recent cases in California demonstrate that the current state of 
 
78, 117 (2011) (“Arbitration’s attributed utilities — speed, low cost, and informality — became more important 
as the Court lost interest in power imbalances and in the idea that enforcement required negotiation and actual 
consent.”); S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a 
Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 270–71 (2012) (discussing representative relief, a major 
issue in class arbitration which requires increased judicial involvement in response to due process concerns 
related to judgment without the possibility of review). 
 73. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (“If procedures are too informal, absent class members would not be 
bound by the arbitration.”); see also Jacob Spencer, Arbitration, Class Waivers, and Statutory Rights, 35 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 991, 1010 (2012) (noting that after Concepcion, courts required this procedural formality for 
all class-action suits in order to avoid the risk of defendants being bound to determinations without the 
possibility of judicial review). 
 74. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752. 
 75. See id. at 1746–47. 
 76. Id. at 1748. 
 77. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Buzenes v. Nuvell Fin. Services, No. B221870, 2012 WL 208051, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2012) 
(unpublished decision) (refusing to acknowledge that the Concepcion holding abrogated California’s rule 
against class action arbitration agreements), review granted, (May 9, 2012); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 
LLC, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 28–29 (Ct. App. 2011) (limiting the Concepcion ruling to apply to class action waivers 
that conflict with arbitration provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act), petition for review granted, 272 P.3d 976 
(Cal. 2012); Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012 WL 370557, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 
2012) (asserting the California court’s right to review a contract containing an arbitration agreement is based on 
California law under which such agreement is void if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable); 
Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that the California 
Court of Appeals was correct for not applying Concepcion to employee arbitration dispute). 
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arbitration in California generally favors challenges to arbitration clauses,80 but 
there is still the possibility that a properly drafted and negotiated arbitration 
agreement will be enforced. While California is clearly a leader in consumer-
friendly law, it is unclear to what extent other states will follow California’s 
aggressive stance against compelling arbitration. Still, important lessons can be 
learned from California’s cases as to how to draft arbitration clauses that may 
withstand attack, even in California. 
B. California Courts Find Arbitration Unconscionable Post-Concepcion 
California state courts and the Ninth Circuit have been the most fertile ground for 
challenges to arbitration agreements based on unconscionability.81 It is because of 
the volume of cases there that this Article now looks primarily at California case 
law. Certainly different jurisdictions are less aggressive in finding arbitration 
agreements unenforceable,82 but to work towards drafting an agreement that a 
drafter can rely upon to be enforced in the majority of circumstances, it is best to 
study the extremes. 
California courts have identified various factors that when considered together 
can render an arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable.83 The courts 
 
 80. See, e.g., Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 486–89 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(affirming the trial court’s determination that an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable without 
a showing of substantial need); Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 712, 728, 733 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(stating that the FAA does not preempt state law challenges for arbitration agreements and held that the 
arbitration clause “as a whole [was] unconscionable and therefore unenforceable”); Doubt v. NCR Corp., No. C 
09–05917 SBA, 2010 WL 3619854, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (finding arbitration agreement that limited 
discovery of a weaker party to be unconscionable noting the unfairness of an agreement that “compels 
arbitration of [only] the types of claims more likely to be brought by the weaker party”) (citing Fitz v. NCR 
Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 104 (2004)). Contra Lucas v. Hertz Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(upholding an arbitration agreement in a consumer contract on the grounds that “in this post-Concepcion 
landscape, the arbitration agreement is not substantively unconscionable”), reconsideration denied, No. C 11–
01581 LB, 2012 WL 3638568 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012). 
 81. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class 
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 400–02 n.139–50 (2005) (arguing that the multitude of cases from California in 
which arbitration agreements are deemed unconscionable defies the norm in other jurisdictions). While 
California was one of the first states to accept challenges to arbitration agreements on grounds of 
unconscionability, by 2011, when Concepcion was decided, at least 14 states had held that class action waivers in 
arbitration agreements were unenforceable. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in 
the Wake of AT&T v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 633 (2012). 
 82. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding 
an arbitration agreement in an employee contract that the employee did not read); In re Checking Account 
Overdraft Litig., MDL No. 2036, 672 F.3d 1224, 1229–30 (11th Cir. 2012) (ruling that an the arbitration clause 
in a bank’s deposit agreement was not procedurally unconscionable under Georgia law), cert. denied sub nom. 
Hough v. Regions Fin. Corp., 133 S. Ct. 430 (2012); Soto v. State Indus. Prods., Inc., 642 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 
2011) (concluding that an mandatory arbitrary agreement is not unconscionable under Puerto Rican law). 
 83. See Lau, 2012 WL 370557, at *8–9 (finding an arbitration agreement “procedurally unconscionable 
because the agreement was oppressive and created unfair surprise”); Buzenes, 2012 WL 208051, at *6 (applying 
the unconscionability factors in finding arbitration agreement unconscionable); Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
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have found procedural unconscionability where the actual arbitration clause is 
inconspicuously located in the agreement (e.g., on the back of the last page).84 
Courts also analyze the style and size of fonts to determine whether the buyer could 
adequately identify the clause.85 
Most important to courts is the consumer’s opportunity to negotiate terms of 
the contract, although the agreements are almost always boilerplate.86 Still, 
California courts are looking for some evidence of a meaningful opportunity for 
negotiation and absent that they are likely to find a clause procedurally 
unconscionable.87 Specifically, courts noted the creditor’s failure to give a consumer 
adequate time to read the contract, the failure to mention the arbitration clause to 
the consumer and state its importance, and the failure to require that the consumer 
initial pages and certain provisions.88 
California courts have also identified various factors which render an arbitration 
agreement substantively unconscionable.89 The focus is on the effect of the 
agreement’s terms, not whether they appear fair on their face.90 Courts viewed a 
term which allowed the creditor to retain its right to self-help repossession as one-
sided because the consumer was still subject to arbitration for any conceivable claim 
 
30–31 (identifying the two factors considered for procedural unconscionability by the California Courts and 
providing numerous examples). 
 84. See, e.g., Flores v. W. Covina Auto Grp., 212 Cal. App. 4th 895, 921–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“The 
general rule that a party cannot avoid the terms of a contract because the party failed to read it before signing it 
applies even to adhesion contracts, when the provisions are conspicuous and clear and do not defeat the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.”); Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 265 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (“[C]ourts will not enforce provisions in adhesion contracts which limit the duties or liability of the 
stronger party unless such provisions are ‘conspicuous, plain and clear’ . . . .”(citing Madden v. Kaiser Found. 
Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1185 (Cal. 1976) (en banc))); Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. 
Rptr. 347, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding an arbitration agreement inconspicuously written on the back page 
of a contract unconscionable). 
 85. See Lucas, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1004–05 (finding that the small font and style made arbitration agreement 
“nearly illegible” and thus unconscionable). But see Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 30–31 (asserting that typeface 
in an agreement is an item taken into consideration for procedural unconscionability, but that the location of 
the agreement on the back of the contract controls unconscionability). 
 86. See Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 276 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding an arbitration clause 
unconscionable because it was presented on a take it or leave it basis and because there was no opportunity to 
negotiate any of the preprinted terms). 
 87. See Bruni v. Didion, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 409 (Ct. App. 2008) (“‘Oppression’ arises from an inequality 
of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation . . . . ‘Surprise’ involves . . . supposedly agreed-upon 
terms of the bargain [being] hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the 
disputed terms.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 88. See Gutierrez, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 276 (arbitration clause unconscionable because the buyer was not made 
aware of its presence in the lease or required to initial the clause). 
 89. See id. at 275–76 (“Substantive unconscionability focuses on whether the provision is overly harsh or 
one-sided and is shown if the disputed provision of the contract falls outside the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the 
nondrafting party or is ‘unduly oppressive.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 90. See Saika v. Gold, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 923 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that, despite a clause within an 
arbitration agreement purporting to allow parties to disregard the results of arbitration and litigate under 
certain circumstances, “the practical effect of the clause is to tilt the playing field . . .”). 
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the consumer might have.91 Thus, the clause lacked “bilaterality.”92 Also 
substantively unconscionable were terms that put the burden of high arbitration 
costs on the consumer93 and procedures for appeal which provided the consumer 
with no meaningful opportunity to appeal and thus unjustly favored the creditor.94 
Considering the facts of these cases, one wonders what arbitration clause would 
be enforceable in California. Even one creditor’s attempt to argue that an 
arbitration clause was not procedurally unconscionable because the consumer 
could have bought the consumer product from another merchant under a contract 
which did not contain an arbitration term was rebuffed by a California state court.95 
The court stated that it was not obligated to enforce procedurally unconscionable 
agreements just because there is a market affording a consumer choice, especially 
since no evidence was presented that arbitration clauses were not universal contract 
terms in that market.96 The California courts have been clear that the procedural 
element focuses specifically on the negotiation of the sales contract in the dealer’s 
office and courts seem unlikely to consider other realities in the process of a 
consumer buying a product.97 
Still, two recent California cases offer some hope for compelling arbitration. In a 
case recently decided in federal district court in California, the court compelled 
arbitration where the agreement contained a delegation provision by which the 
parties had agreed to have the arbitrator decide the issue of arbitability.98 Although 
the arbitration clause in this case had the same terms as those declared 
unconscionable in the cases discussed above, the court did not find that it was 
 
 91. Flores v. Transamerica, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 383 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that a lender attempted to 
advantage itself by avoiding arbitration on its own claims by reserving the ability to foreclose on a borrower 
while restricting borrowers to arbitration on their claims). 
 92. Id. at 382. 
 93. See Gutierrez, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 277 (discussing the unconscionability of an arbitration clause that 
builds prohibitively expensive fees into the process for which the consumer is responsible); Lau v. Mercedes-
Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012 WL 370557, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (finding an arbitration 
clause substantially unconscionable because it would require a buyer to advance between $10,000 and $15,000 
to arbitrate his claim). 
 94. See Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 33, 35 (Ct. App. 2011), petition for review 
granted, 272 P.3d 976 (Cal. 2012) (finding that an arbitration clause which stipulates that either party may 
appeal an initial decision only if the award exceeds $100,000 or is in the form of injunctive relief has the effect of 
benefitting the party with superior bargaining power and is thus unconscionable). 
 95. See id. at 31 (“[C]ourts are not obligated to enforce highly unfair provisions that undermine important 
public policies simply because there is some degree of consumer choice in the market.” (quoting Gatton v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 356 (Ct. App. 2007))). 
 96. Id. at 31–32. 
 97. See Ann Tracey & Shelly McGill, Seeking a Rational Lawyer for Consumer Claims After the Supreme 
Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 462 (2012) 
(arguing that by focusing on the ability to negotiate terms of an arbitration clause, courts are obfuscating the 
reality that such clauses are presented on a take it or leave it basis, such that consumers have no alternative but 
to agree to such clauses). 
 98. Order Granting Motion to Compel Arbitration at 8–9, Hamby v. Power Toyota Irvine, 798 F. Supp. 2d 
1163 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 3:11-cv-00544-BTM-BGS). 
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permeated with unconscionability and therefore certain unconscionable provisions 
could not be severed.99 Importantly, however, the court noted that the buyer had 
acknowledged reading, understanding, and agreeing to the terms of the contract.100 
Thus, there was no clear procedural unconscionability to the arbitration agreement. 
Had the court found more evidence of procedural unconscionability, it might not 
have been as quick to compel arbitration, but the importance of counsel’s reliance 
on the delegation provision cannot be ignored. 
In a recent California state court of appeals case, the court similarly compelled 
arbitration.101 The court found that because the arbitration agreement in the motor 
vehicle retail installment sale contract at issue was imposed on the buyer without 
the opportunity for negotiation, it was an adhesion contract and therefore the 
transaction was procedurally unconscionable.102 However, while the degree of 
procedural unconscionability was enough to trigger the court’s examination of the 
terms of the contract,103 the court did not find significant substantive 
unconscionability in the contract sufficient to void the arbitration agreement.104 
Significantly, the arbitration agreement at issue contained many of the provisions 
described in the Drafter’s Guide section below.105 The court found that the one 
suggestion of substantive unconscionability in the arbitration agreement — a lack 
of bilaterality caused by a clause which failed to permit an “appeal” arbitration in 
the event a buyer sought and was denied injunctive relief — was mitigated by a 
provision permitting a second arbitration if the buyer were denied a monetary 
recovery.106 With regard to substantive unconscionability in general, the court 
stated: “[O]ne-sidedness, standing alone, is not sufficient to qualify an arbitration 
clause as substantively unconscionable. . . . It is the attempt to make the arbitration 
proceeding something other than a fair forum that ‘shocks the conscience.’”107 
III. A Drafter’s Guide 
Even after Concepcion, arbitration agreements must be designed to convey to 
consumers the implications of entering into an arbitration agreement and must also 
strive to ensure that consumers will be able to vindicate their rights. Practically, 
what this requires is that an arbitration clause be prominent and substantively even-
handed. A well-written arbitration agreement will not only protect the drafting 
party (and its assigns) from class action, but a well-written arbitration agreement 
 
 99. Id. at 13–14. 
 100. Id. at 16. 
 101. Vasquez v. Greene Motors, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 4th 1172, 1179 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1186. 
 104. Id. at 1199–1200. 
 105. See infra Part III. 
 106. Vasquez, 214 Cal. App. 4th at 1199–1200. 
 107. Id. at 1193. 
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will also allow consumers to adequately assert their rights. Such an agreement will 
be enforceable under Concepcion and also should withstand attacks based upon the 
state contract law doctrine of unconscionability.108 
So how do we draft such an agreement? The most effective strategy is to 
deconstruct the consumer arguments about procedural and substantive 
unconscionability, and then draft clauses designed to neutralize or minimize those 
arguments. Thus, the arbitration cases surveyed above are instructive as to how to 
draft clauses that will be conspicuous in the contract and that will be considered 
fair, which as a concept has unfortunately proven to be a moving target for 
practitioners.109 
The recommendations that follow are not all necessarily required to ensure an 
enforceable arbitration agreement. By the same token, an arbitration agreement 
that precisely traces this outline cannot be guaranteed to withstand every challenge. 
There is no perfect contract as state law is constantly evolving; one can only draft a 
clause that attempts to incorporate the lessons that available law provides. We also 
note that the authors’ expertise lies in the auto finance industry and thus these 
recommendations are derived chiefly from that perspective. 
A. Drafting to Avoid Claims of Procedural Unconscionability 
The first, and perhaps easiest, drafting advice is to design the form of the contract to 
draw attention to the arbitration clause. Thus, the arbitration clause should be 
contained in the related contract, or attached to and incorporated by specific 
reference to the related contract. An arbitration agreement should be conspicuous. 
It should not be placed in a “bill stuffer”110 included in a mailing to the buyer after 
the deal has been formally executed or approved. If the arbitration clause is not 
contained on the first or front page of the contract, the contract should include a 
provision in a prominent location indicating where the arbitration clause is located, 
and encouraging the buyer to read the entire contract, including the arbitration 
clause. A conservative practitioner may also want to include in the reference 
provision an agreement that the consumer has read the arbitration clause and 
agrees to its terms. Placing signature or initial lines in the arbitration reference 
provision for the consumer to sign further evidences the consumer’s knowledge of 
and agreement to the terms contained in the arbitration clause. 
 
 108. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (stating that although the savings 
clause in Section 2 of the FAA preserves state-law rules such as contract defenses, the section will not prevent 
the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives which are to streamline the arbitration process and ensure that 
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms).  
 109. See supra Part II.B. 
 110. Kortum-Managhan v. Herbergers NBGL, 204 P.3d 693, 700 (Mont. 2009) (finding that a “bill stuffer” 
— a provision within a billing statement sent along with other junk mail — that sought to “lull [a consumer] 
into agreeing to waive her constitutional rights” was “sneaky and unfair”). 
 Drafting Arbitration Agreements 
378 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
In addition, the title of the credit contract should indicate in some manner that 
the credit contract contains an arbitration provision. Any acknowledgement 
provision affirming the consumer’s review and receipt of a completed agreement 
should also contain a reference to the arbitration provision contained in the 
contract, and acknowledgment of review of such provision. 
The arbitration provision itself should be conspicuous. There is no special 
formula for making the clause conspicuous; what makes it conspicuous will depend 
on the layout and appearance of the contract. To make the arbitration provision 
conspicuous, a drafter may adjust the font, type size, type color, location, and 
bordering of the provision. 
Still, even when all pages are initialed by the consumer, courts have found 
procedural unconscionability.111 Because preprinted contracts are provided to 
consumers on a “take it or leave it” basis and consumers typically have no 
meaningful opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract, these contracts of 
adhesion can be deemed procedurally unconscionable.112 However, considering the 
general acceptance of a preprinted contract in Concepcion,113 the focus shifts to a 
consumer’s ability to understand the contract provisions. Thus, it is important to 
actually direct the consumer to take time to read the contract and it may also be 
necessary to explicitly tell the consumer that any disputes are subject to mandatory 
arbitration. 
Besides the physical appearance of the contract, the manner in which the 
contract is presented and described by the creditor to the consumer is also 
important in a court’s determination of procedural unconscionability. Although 
this is not advice as to how to actually draft the agreement, it is still germane to the 
issue of procedural unconscionability. To this end, the creditor should specifically 
identify for the consumer the fact that the contract contains an arbitration 
provision. A creditor should also explain in common parlance what the result of 
agreeing to the arbitration provision is (i.e., that both parties will have to arbitrate 
certain disputes and will not be able to sue in court). It would be best to have these 
explanations scripted and approved by competent counsel. The script should 
conclude with an admonition to the consumer to read the entire clause with care 
and to also consult his own lawyer if the buyer has any questions. 
Another approach to addressing procedural unconscionability, and countering 
the typical consumer-advocate argument that a consumer did not have adequate 
time to consider the contract’s terms, is to actually provide a meaningful 
opportunity for the consumer to opt out of the arbitration clause. This could take 
 
 111. See, e.g., Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012 WL 370557, at *21 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 31, 2012) (arbitration clause was deemed procedurally unconscionable even though purchaser 
acknowledged by signature that he read the entire purchase agreement). 
 112. See Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 276 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 113. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (contract provided for arbitration of all disputes to be brought in the 
parties’ individual capacity and authorized AT&T to unilaterally amend provisions). 
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the form of a provision in the arbitration clause that would provide that within 
thirty days of signing the contract the consumer could unconditionally choose to 
opt out of the agreement to arbitrate by informing the creditor in writing of his 
intent to do so. A creditor offering an opt-out must establish a system to track 
consumers who exercise that option. 
B. Drafting to Avoid Claims of Substantive Unconscionability 
While unconscionability contains two elements that must be satisfied,114 drafting to 
avoid claims of substantive unconscionability is the drafter’s most important goal. 
It is more important than drafting around procedural unconscionability because, as 
has been noted, nearly all consumer contracts are boilerplate contracts that a court 
could easily deem an adhesion contract.115 Thus, because both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability must be found for a contract provision to be declared 
unconscionable, and a court can often easily make a finding of procedural 
unconscionability, substantive issues come to the fore when drafting an enforceable 
arbitration provision. 
Creditors gain a significant benefit from arbitration in class action avoidance, 
and so when it comes to crafting an enforceable arbitration agreement, substantive 
unconscionability requires that the agreement provide incentives to consumers to 
arbitrate and a fair and adequate process where a consumer may vindicate his 
claims. A drafter should consider the following suggestions when addressing 
substantive unconscionability. Consistent with the approach to avoid claims of 
procedural unconscionability, there is no particular manner of drafting an 
unassailable arbitration provision in terms of substantive unconscionability. Thus, 
inclusion of all of these recommended suggestions provides no guarantee that a 
provision will be enforced and, in a similar vein, not all these provisions need to be 
incorporated to ensure that a court will compel arbitration. 
There are things the creditor can do to make an arbitration agreement fairer to 
the consumer. The creditor can agree to advance on behalf of the buyer the costs of 
arbitration and the costs of any appeal. The advancement of funds can be 
conditioned in ways that will reduce the creditor’s exposure, but obviously the less 
consumer friendly the provision is, the more likely a court will be to view the 
provision as oppressive and thus substantively unconscionable. For example, the 
creditor could agree to advance funds subject to reimbursement of costs to the 
extent the claim is found by the arbitrator to be frivolous. An example of a less 
consumer-friendly option would be to allow for reimbursement of costs at the 
discretion of the arbitrator, or to only advance funds if the consumer is able to show 
an inability to pay or that the arbitration would be cost-prohibitive. 
 
 114. Broome, supra note 27, at 48. 
 115. See Gutierrez, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 276; see also supra text accompanying note 84. 
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Also relating to the financial burdens of arbitration on a consumer, the 
arbitration clause could provide for shifting fees to the successful claimant, 
including attorney’s fees and expert costs. To remove the stench of oppression, the 
creditor can also waive its right to seek attorney’s fees or allow the consumer the 
option to file actions in small claims court. This last provision attempts to 
overcome the consumer advocate argument that a consumer is unable to vindicate 
small claims through normal channels. 
In an effort to ensure the “bilaterality” of the contract, if the creditor is 
permitted under the arbitration clause to exercise a right under the law, such as self-
help repossession without waiving the right to arbitrate, the clause should also 
explicitly provide a consumer a comparable right under the law, such as filing an 
action in court for individual injunctive relief. 
Courts have considered provisions limiting rights to appeal if an award in 
arbitration exceeds a certain sum of money as benefitting only the creditor and thus 
unconscionable.116 Therefore, any right to appeal granted in an arbitration clause 
should be limited to the circumstances permitted by the FAA. In that instance, both 
the creditor and consumer share the same limited right, which may be amended 
from time to time under the FAA and is not dependent on the award in any 
particular transaction. The arbitration clause should also provide for a venue that is 
convenient to the consumer, and indicate that the arbitration will take place in the 
county, state, or federal district of the consumer’s residence, or some other similar 
place that is convenient to the consumer. Such a provision would of course be 
subject to any relevant state limitations on venue. For example, the Wisconsin 
Consumer Act, applicable to consumer credit transactions with an amount financed 
of $25,000 or less, contains venue limitations.117 A wise practitioner should not 
overlook state laws entirely when drafting an arbitration provision governed by the 
FAA. 
The clause should also provide that the arbitrator may award the types of 
individual relief available in a court proceeding, including injunctions and punitive 
damages. This ensures that in agreeing to arbitrate, the consumer has not forgone 
any possible judicial remedies he may have had and thus reduces the theoretical 
oppressiveness of the contract. 
Like AT&T’s arbitration agreement that was at issue in Concepcion, another 
provision a drafter may employ is a so-called “bump up” provision.118 Such a 
provision provides that if the arbitrator issues an award to the consumer that is 
greater than the creditor’s last written settlement offer, the creditor will pay an 
 
 116. See, e.g., Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 984–85 (Cal. 2003) (finding unconscionable a 
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 117. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 421.401 (West 1988). 
 118. Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Impact of Concepcion on Consumer Financial Services 
Arbitration Agreements and the Future of Consumer Litigation, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP., May 25, 2011, at 
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additional dollar amount over the arbitrator’s award.119 For example, AT&T’s 
arbitration agreement provided for a $7,500 “bump up,” plus double the amount of 
the attorney’s fees.120 This directly addresses the consumer advocate argument that 
mandatory arbitration agreements disadvantage consumers and deny them a 
greater remedy that could only be achieved through class action litigation. In fact, 
the California district court in Concepcion noted that the Plaintiffs were actually 
better off under the arbitration agreement with AT&T than pursuing their claims 
through class action litigation because with this provision they had a much better 
opportunity at securing meaningful damages when compared to class litigation.121 
The Concepcion Court noted that in class litigation, the Plaintiffs would have been 
in class litigation for years (instead of months with arbitration) and that once a 
settlement or verdict was reached, only then would they have an opportunity to 
submit their claims for a small percentage of the dollar award.122 
C. Standard Required General Language 
There are also certain other important provisions that every well-drafted arbitration 
agreement must include. Although they do not necessarily bear on whether the 
clause would stand up to an attack based on the theory of unconscionability, these 
drafting recommendations are nonetheless important and therefore included in this 
Article. 
The class action waiver is the focal point of any arbitration clause. Without a 
class action waiver, one need not engage in arbitration. In addition to a class action 
waiver, every arbitration clause should expressly adopt the FAA as the governing 
law for its provisions.123 Thus, where the language of the clause leaves gaps that must 
be filled or explained, those gaps will be filled or explained by the FAA, which is 
generally more favorable to creditors. Like a venue clause, the agreement should 
name one or more of the various arbitration organizations as the arbitrator (e.g., 
the American Arbitration Association or JAMS), and should also give the consumer 
the option of selecting another arbitration organization to arbitrate the dispute, 
subject to the creditor’s approval. By giving additional, more open-ended choices, 
the creditor will be protected should one or more of the organizations cease 
conducting consumer arbitrations and will gain some insulation from claims that a 
particular arbitration organization is biased as to the creditor because the creditor is 
a repeat customer. 
 
 119. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 111, at 4.  
 120. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011); see Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 
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 121. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See, e.g., VERIZON WIRELESS CUSTOMER AGREEMENT ARBITRATION CLAUSE, available at 
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Along these lines, the agreement should explicitly allow for either party to the 
contract to request arbitration, but it should not require arbitration of every 
possible dispute. This allows a creditor or consumer to proceed with a non-judicial 
process or in court, and also to opt into arbitration as necessary, for example, if a 
dispute leads to a class action. At the same time, the definition of “dispute” or 
“claim” for which either party may demand arbitration should be broadly defined 
to encompass disputes that occur in the application, origination, servicing, and 
collection stages of a credit transaction. The agreement should indicate that the 
arbitration will take place in the county, state, or federal district of the consumer’s 
residence, or some other place convenient to the consumer. This is obviously a 
consumer-friendly provision that goes to defending against attacks that the 
agreement is substantively unconscionable. 
Similar to a delegation clause in any standard contract, the arbitration agreement 
should stipulate that the arbitrator will decide issues of arbitrability and 
enforceability of the clause. The arbitration agreement should also provide for the 
(hopefully) unlikely event that the class action waiver or other provision of an 
arbitration clause is deemed unenforceable. If the class action waiver provision is 
deemed unenforceable, a “poison pill” in the arbitration clause should void the 
entire arbitration clause.124 As stated in Concepcion,125 arbitration and class actions 
are incompatible, and therefore the arbitration clause should fail in the event the 
class action waiver is deemed unenforceable. If any other provision is deemed 
unenforceable, the arbitration clause should remain valid. 
D. The Road Ahead 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-
Frank Act) requires the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (the “CFPB” or 
the “Bureau”) to conduct a study concerning the use of mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements by banks and other covered entities under the CFPB’s 
supervision.126 Based on the conclusions of the study, the CFPB may impose 
conditions or limitations on the use of such arbitration agreements and is even 
permitted by the Dodd-Frank Act to prohibit their use altogether “if the Bureau 
finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the 
public interest and for the protection of consumers.”127 Of course, such a 
prohibition would apply only to those entities over which the CFPB has direct 
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authority, but depending on the structure of a given consumer transaction, this 
could cover a potentially wide swath of creditors. 
The CFPB is currently conducting the study and because by law it is not 
permitted to issue regulations until concluding the study, any potential regulations 
would likely not be effective until 2014 or beyond.128 Still, the nature of the study 
and its conclusions will provide an indication of what type of regulations the CFPB 
might eventually promulgate, or whether the CFPB will prohibit arbitration 
agreements altogether. Any drafter should remain aware of the Bureau’s study and 
watch out for the regulations, which almost inevitably will be promulgated. 
Conclusion 
While the future of arbitration is uncertain, for the next couple of years arbitration 
will remain a useful tool to quickly and efficiently handle individual consumer 
disputes. By using arbitration clauses with the requisite class action waiver, creditors 
avoid the time and expense involved in defending a class action.129 At the same time, 
consumer complaints can be adjudicated by an arbitrator just as quickly and easily 
(if not more) as in a judicial setting.130 Although arbitration clauses continue to be a 
viable consumer contract option, as this Article has explained,131 such clauses must 
be carefully drafted by competent counsel with consumer fairness in mind to 
withstand enforceability challenges.132 
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